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 Crises are, by definition, interpretive issues, if for no other reason than 
assessments of their existence or magnitude often become causal explanations for 
change.  The debate over peasant standard of living in late imperial Russia—the “crisis” 
of Russia’s rural economy—is an interpretive issue tackled by historians from a number 
of different perspectives and with varying degrees of success.  Recent work casting 
doubt upon the decline of peasant living standards highlights the inadequacies of 
historians’ selected assessment tools and suggests that better (demographic) measures 
will not only expose the crisis as non-existent but reveal ‘the heretical possibility that the 
reforms of the 1860s might have actually bettered the peasant’s lot’.1  But it is one thing 
for historians to demonstrate that the crisis was non-existent and quite another to 
explain why contemporaries saw the peasant economy as a crisis-ridden institution.  At 
first glance, the answer to this question appears obvious.  Peasant ‘backwardness’, the 
constraints of communal tenure, and tax arrears all pointed to an economy unable to 
meet its obligations.  At the same time, post-emancipation descriptions of peasant life—
culminating, perhaps, with A. I. Shingarev’s The Dying Village (1907)—offered an image 
of peasant life so dire and radically at odds with that of the Empire’s westernized elite 
that few in educated society could look upon the village and its economy and see 
anything other than crisis (even though they might disagree among themselves as to its 
cause).2  However, given the fact that historians (like Russian statisticians and 
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agronomists before them) devote so much attention to measuring peasant standard of 
living it is surprising that none address the impact of the 'rise of statistical thinking' and 
attendant forms of economic measurement on the creation of this crisis perception.3  A 
growing emphasis on measuring the sufficiency of peasant land allotments in terms of 
assessed land values (the application of cadastre measurement) created a statistical 
portrait of rural crisis.  Statistical measurement—the conversion of economic 
phenomena into numbers—objectified the crisis and surrounded it with the aura of 
‘scientific’ objectivity.4  The melding of this new cadastre measure of ‘sufficiency’ with 
traditional paternalism made peasant living standards appear desperate and the state’s 
failure to protect its subjects deplorable. 
 
Statistics and Sufficiency 
The state began enumerating its taxable assets with the first of a series of tax 
censuses (revizii) in 1720-1721.5  By the mid-eighteenth century, spurred by the Free 
Economic Society, magnate serf owners and their managers were using improved 
record-keeping practices to compile systematic serf household inventories.  
Enumeration implied control and maximum exploitation of these assets.  For the state 
and its noble servitors alike, ‘high revenues rested on the ability of estate administrators 
to make each serf tiaglo (labor team) equally capable of cultivating the land without 
exhausting the peasants or their draft animals’. 6  Proper analysis of estate production 
might also reveal paths to more efficient serf management and asset allocation, such as 
one author’s conclusion that serfs tilling improved land produced greater income.7  In 
areas less conducive to agriculture, estate managers and bureaucrats focussed on the 
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totality of peasant household economic activity—farming, trades and wages—in order 
to discover possible insufficiencies, and duly recorded each household’s endowment of 
labor, inventory, and non-agricultural earnings.8  Managers, assisted by communal 
elders, maximized income by ensuring that each household had sufficient resources to 
meet obligations to lord, commune and state.  They apportioned estate lands evenly 
between peasant household labor teams, and evidence indicates that other assets 
remained rather evenly distributed on the basis of ability to work and pay.  As historian 
Peter Czap noted, ‘the commune and/or estate administration achieved a high degree 
of success in controlling [the distribution of horses and land,] and in this way enforced 
their own criteria for a minimum standard of living among all the households on the 
estate’.9 
It is difficult to imagine that all serf owners operated as efficiently as the 
Gagarins, Sheremetevs, or other magnates.  One also suspects that even the most 
diligent estate stewards failed to control all sources of peasant income through 
enumeration.  Yet, managers of serfs and state peasants knew that their income 
depended on maintaining their productive assets—on ensuring that each household had 
sufficient resources to engage in agriculture, trades, wage labor, or some combination 
of employment.  As historian Steven Hoch noted, estate bailiffs ‘did not ruthlessly exploit 
their peasants for short-run gains’, realizing that ‘the profitability of the estate was 
directly related to the peasants’ material well-being’.  Such paternalism was ‘more self-
serving than benign’.  This concept of sufficiency emerged in public discussions of 
estate management.  Managers well knew the allotment size necessary, under given 
environmental conditions, to maintain the estate’s servile assets and produce revenue.10  
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This traditional concept of ‘sufficiency’ was a ‘moral economy’ in which masters 
gauged the health of their assets (and the extent to which they could exploit them) not in 
terms of land productivity, but in terms of each household’s total income from all 
sources. This paternalistic model manifested itself in a number of nineteenth-century 
peasant reforms, including the serf emancipation of 1861.11 
From this perspective, peasant households were not participants in a single 
market economy, but autarkic units (the commune a collection of such units) existing 
within a separate natural economy that, hopefully, met their material needs, and at the 
same time guarantee their ability to pay a variety of obligations and taxes.  Peasants 
were economic assets to be maintained and exploited by state, court, or—prior to 
1861—serf owner.  The rural economy thus consisted of two sectors—peasant and 
noble (pomeshchik).  This conception of a dual rural economy became codified in the 
emancipation process, in which officials hoped that land allotments would provide for 
basic peasant needs and that compensation provided to former serf owners would lead 
to the intensification of noble agriculture.  Combined with the granting of land 
allotments, reformers believed that strengthening the commune in the emancipation 
process (and afterwards) would permanently guarantee peasants access to sufficient 
resources and immunize them from proletarianization.  Thus, 'in Russia, from the mid-
seventeenth century, being a peasant (with few exceptions) implied an entitlement to 
land'.12 
This paternalistic emphasis on sufficiency or well-being (much in line with other 
European states' increasing activism in the name of public welfare) persisted until the 
empire's demise in 1917 (to be taken up in modified form by the Bolsheviks).  However, 
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this posed the question of what sort of measurement best suited these goals.  By the 
1830s, reformers who envisioned an Empire based on the rule of law and the rational 
administration of Russia’s agrarian resources were already familiar with a European 
technique that appeared to be ideally suited for measuring an agrarian economy: a 
cadastre.  Cadastral surveys performed a number of tasks for European states—from 
facilitating land reclamation in Holland through recording the results of land reforms and 
creating ordered colonial settlement patterns.  Their most significant role in 
administration, however (dating from the financial burdens of the Thirty Years' War and 
regularized in much of Europe under Napoleon) lay in land taxation.13  Cadastres rested 
on the assumption that all farmers lived as “economic men” seeking maximum profits.  
The main variable and principal object of measurement in any economic assessment, 
therefore, was the land itself.  By assessing soil fertility (type), average production costs 
for various types of grain, and location (distance to market), one could arrive at a 
property’s objective value.  Europe's economists, statisticians and state servitors 
believed that cadastral surveys were so crucial to rational administration that when their 
representatives met in Brussels in 1853 for the First International Statistical Congress, 
cadastres topped their agenda.  The Congress' subsequent resolution noted that 
cadastres not only provided a rational basis for state fiscal operations, but also supplied 
individual property owners with a means to trace and demonstrate their ownership.  
State and liberal goals could be mapped simultaneously.14 
A cadastre offered Russian officials a systematic portrait of the Empire’s land 
assets and productive capabilities that would allow them to foster more general 
prosperity by developing infrastructure and adjusting taxes (up or down) to reflect 
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income. Furthermore, it provided a measure that was especially useful because it 
universalized the agricultural economy.  Differences between peasant and non-peasant 
levels of production were simply attributed to the ‘irrationality’ of the benighted masses.  
The Empire’s rural economy was thus heterogeneous only in the sense that it covered a 
wide and diverse territory.  This cadastre paradigm projected an image of Russia as a 
society of rational actors in which (ironically) the estate-based particularism of the old 
regime would ultimately disappear.15  From this perspective, the cadastre as a form of 
measurement reflected modern, universalistic assumptions about Russia’s rural 
economy and society.  Its focus on land and its elimination of the human factor 
promised a rational basis of administration and an objective basis for taxation.  
Cadastral maps and tables would allow officials to ‘see like a state,’ and thus bring 
Russia’s vast land resources under their control.16 
Officials' increased desire and ability to enumerate and tabulate--especially in 
cadastral terms--created a statistical image of a peasant economy mired in crisis. 
Combined with a tradition of maintaining peasants as productive serf assets and the 
emancipation’s goal of creating an autarkic peasant economy, calculating land value by 
such bookkeeping means implied that peasant household sufficiency could now be 
objectively measured in terms of land productivity and assessed value.  As renowned 
geographer and statistician P. P. Semenov argued during debates on the serf 
emancipation process, this assumption was erroneous for two reasons.17  First, 
cadastres were instruments designed to equalize the distribution of land taxes.  They 
did not provide the actual value of the land, but only its relative value (i. e., its value for 
tax purposes in relation to that of other properties).  Thus it was possible that, ‘by the 
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rules of a cadastre the incomes on some estates increase and others decrease by 10, 
20, 30 and more percent’.18  Second, Semenov noted that a cadastral system 
contradicted the dual rural economy—with peasant and noble components—being 
constructed in the serf emancipation process:  
If the land remaining…in peasant use as a guarantee of their life served them like 
capital…then…reassessments [cadastral surveys] would not be excessively 
burdensome for peasants.  But for them remains, and with several reductions, 
their existing allotments—only that guaranteeing their existence.  Almost all 
production from the land given out to the peasant goes directly to feed him and 
not for trade speculation.19 
Thus, as a measure, cadastres were unsuited both for determining actual land 
values and measuring peasant well-being.  As the agrarian economist A. V. Chaianov 
later noted, using ‘a series of conventional methods, pricing family labor at wage rates, 
and so on, you can, of course, calculate “capitalist rent” in the economic sense….  But 
these exercises…will have no social and economic content’.20  Or, as the English 
observer Donald MacKenzie Wallace observed in the 1870s: 
The rural life, and…economic organization, of Russia is so peculiar…that even 
the fullest data regarding the quantity of land enjoyed by the peasantry, the 
amount of dues paid for it, the productivity of the soil, [and] the price of 
grain…would convey to the Englishman’s mind no clear conception of the 
peasants’ actual condition.21 
 Nonetheless, although lords, state officials like Semenov, and others (zemstvos22 
and their employees) interested in the peasant economy certainly knew that the peasant 
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economy was different—that it was a ‘natural economy’ with little connection to the 
market—few suggested until the mid-1880s that peasant economic activity (well-being) 
could not be measured and evaluated in market terms via the cadastral process.   The 
state found such universalism convenient--a way to simplify the process of collecting 
taxes.23  In addition, Adam Smith and the works of the so-called Manchester School 
found a ready audience in Russia, even if Russian readers tended to interpret them in a 
manner that could only make true believers in laissez faire cringe.  The extent to which 
peasants (and their economic activity) strayed from the path of rational economic 
activity could be explained by either their own benightedness or the institution of 
communal land tenure.24  Thus, as the chair of the Main Committee on Peasant Affairs, 
Ia. I. Rostovtsov, argued early in the serf emancipation process, the emancipation 'must 
lead the peasant both to a freedom of labor, as a source of his further spiritual 
development, and to an improvement in his material well-being'.25  Emancipation would 
remove a key obstacle preventing peasants from developing into rational economic 
actors like everyone else. 
By the mid-1880s statisticians employed to perform tax assessment work for 
many of Russia's zemstvo institutions—filled with a healthy dose of historical economics 
from Germany and a populist faith in the historical mission of Russia's peasantry—had 
before them enough data to conclude that an accurate assessment of peasant land 
income required consideration of 'social factors' beyond market data.26  Average market 
figures for production costs and sale prices did not reflect the natural character of a 
peasant household economy that produced with its own labor and inventory and 
consumed the majority of its produce.  Yet, in spite of this insight—which led to the 
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compilation of household inventory and budget data—zemstvo statisticians continued 
to assess peasant well-being in market (i.e., cadastre) terms by assigning market 
values to budget components and comparing these to figures on peasant tax and 
redemption payments.  The results—especially when researchers assigned a market 
value to the actual labor peasants invested on their plots—nearly always resulted in a 
negative bottom line.  Measuring peasant economic activity in market terms failed to 
account for the peculiarities of natural (subsistence) economies.   As the discussion 
below indicates, they were not alone in this practice, even though they and others 
remained uneasy about the results.  Only the advent of the Organization and Production 
School of economics—which measured well-being relative to a household's structure, 
consumption needs, and organization of production (and considered the marginal utility 
of each unit of labor in a subsistence economy)—provided a means of measuring well-
being within the non-capitalist peasant economy that did not portray peasant 
households as perpetual money-losing (and hence, crisis-ridden) enterprises.27 
Thus, as officials grappled with the task of reforming peasant life throughout the 
post-emancipation period their concerns about peasant household sufficiency (well-
being) constantly collided with a modern vision of the Empire’s rural economy that could 
be measured, mapped and taxed solely in terms of the productivity of the soil or land 
value.  The collision stemmed largely from the fact that book-keeping methods 
associated with a cadastre increasingly came to be seen as a measure of household 
sufficiency.  ‘Sufficient’ peasant land allotments became ‘insufficient’ when observers 
focussed accountant’s eyes on peasant allotments.  This combination of a traditional 
concern for sufficiency with a measurement instrument designed for tax assessment 
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created the impression that the state had cheated peasants in the emancipation 
process and, in doing so, doomed the peasant economy to perpetual poverty.  This 
crisis perception colored state peasant policies until the end of the old regime.  
 
Sufficiency (Ability to Pay) and Land Value in Kiselev’s Reforms and the 
Emancipation 
The first attempt at cadastration came in the 1840s under the auspices of A. P. 
Zablotskii-Desiatovskii's Statistical Section of the Ministry of State Domains’ Department 
of Rural Economy. Work began in 1842 as part of Minister of State Domains Count P. 
D. Kiselev's reform of the state peasantry.  Preliminary research indicated that, although 
the state assigned each commune a collective tax burden based on the number of 
taxable male inhabitants, the commune attached this burden to land; when communes 
repartitioned their lands, they also repartitioned tax burden.  The main problem with this 
system, Kiselev noted, was the disproportion of taxes with land revenues.  Thus, 
improving the state peasantry’s lot and regularizing tax receipts required shifting tax 
burden from persons to land.  A cadastre seemed the most logical means of achieving 
all of these goals.28 
 Between 1842 and 1856, cadastral commissions surveyed state peasant lands in 
twenty-five provinces, classifying these holdings according to fertility, calculating the 
labor necessary for cultivation, and compiling series data on local grain prices.29  
However, regional variations in Russia’s rural economy soon confronted officials with a 
perplexing problem.  Land evaluation proved adequate for fertile black-soil regions, but 
in the north and other areas where cottage industry and wage labor comprised the bulk 
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of peasant income, the cadastral system failed.  Although poor soils often failed to 
meet basic consumption needs, peasant incomes in these areas were nonetheless 
high.  These circumstances forced officials to collect data on non-agricultural incomes, 
thereby converting obrok (quitrent) into “a crude income tax rather than a land tax.”30  
Thus, they measured not only the land’s ability to yield an adequate income, but also 
the adequacy of the household’s total income.  As a result of these endeavors the 
government was able to equalize the tax burden for most state peasants and increase 
its annual revenues by six million rubles without increasing the tax rate.  Reformers also 
succeeded in allotting additional land to peasants whose parcels, measured by 
cadastral means, appeared insufficient.31  However, they also discovered the limitations 
Russian conditions imposed on a cadastral process.  Total income (ability to pay) 
prevailed—both as a gauge of peasant sufficiency and state efficiency. 
 The process of granting a landed emancipation to twenty-two million serfs 
exacerbated the tension between the old concept of sufficiency (overall ability to pay) 
and the emerging new concept of sufficiency framed in cadastre terms (the actual value 
of peasant land allotments).  Alexander II’s initial parameters for a landed emancipation 
were ambiguous.  Imperial Rescripts stipulated a landed emancipation, but gave no 
direction as to the composition or permanency of peasant allotments.32  However, his 
appointment of Ia. I. Rostovtsev as head of the Editing Commissions charged with 
drafting the emancipation statutes ensured that the Rescripts’ “great principles”—that 
peasants would perceive an improvement in their lives and receive an allotment with 
which to maintain themselves and fulfill their obligations—would find a place in 
discussions.  These principles, in Rostovtsev’s mind, came to mean sufficiency in the 
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traditional paternalistic sense (i. e., an ability to pay); the emancipation statute not 
only needed to guarantee peasants a sufficient quantity of plowland, but also access on 
some level to other resources necessary for households to meet their subsistence 
requirements and obligations to the state (i.e., access to the pasture, forest and other 
resources to which they were accustomed).  For ‘personal liberty’ to be meaningful, 
emancipated serfs needed a sufficient quantity of all resources necessary for 
maintaining their livelihoods.33 
Based on these principles, the Editing Commissions’ Economic Section resolved 
that peasants could reject allotments only if other means existed to guarantee their 
livelihood.34  It also argued forcefully (especially in the absence of reliable data) for 
giving peasants allotments in their current sizes.  Noble landowners on the provincial 
committees, concerned with the pace at which their assets appeared to melt before their 
eyes, countered that the use of current allotment size would benefit those who had 
granted miserly allotments, penalize those who had been generous, and strip serf 
owners of all their land in northern and steppe areas where typically serfs had access to 
the entire estate and paid obrok.35  Only allotments based on ‘artificial norms’ (i. e., not 
existing allotments), ‘and besides this [ones of] the smallest possible size’ could ‘lead to 
the swift and natural substitution of compulsory labor by free labor in rural life’.36  To 
make this selfish proposition more attractive, they also averred that an artificial norms 
would create uniformity conducive to tax assessment.  Finally, in response to 
accusations that defining an artificial allotment would be an arbitrary process, nobles 
proposed that existing allotments, ‘established exclusively under the influence of 
serfdom’, were no less arbitrary.37 
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 Both Rostovtsev and the Economic Section rejected these arguments 
(although they sympathized with the predicament presented by northern and steppe 
obrok estates).  For Rostovtsev, any ‘cut-offs’ (otrezki) necessary to remedy the varied 
conditions of serf allotments could not deprive peasants of ‘their current means of 
existence’.38  The Economic Section noted that reducing allotments contradicted state 
goals.  It also disagreed that existing allotments were arbitrary, noting that ‘with few 
exceptions’ they rested ‘on the strength of the centuries-old relations and mutual 
benefits of one and another soslovie [social estate] placed upon the pomeshchik, and 
the moral and material necessity of maintaining in sufficient sizes the life of his 
peasant’.39  Other considerations also favored maintaining the past conception of 
sufficiency after the emancipation.  The task of devising an ‘artificial’ allotment norm 
was prohibitively complex.  It would require the state to ‘define with desired accuracy 
the very needs of the peasant in each locale’, including ‘the actual productivity of the 
land allotment’ and ‘the degree of benefit each peasant obtained from primary, and in 
particular, auxiliary, trades that serve as supplementary income to that received from 
the land’.  The state barely had means to survey existing allotments, let alone new 
ones.40  The Economic Section also suggested that artificial norms would ultimately 
undermine both peasants and nobles because resultant peasant dissatisfaction might 
exceed the state’s ability to maintain order.41 
To avoid penalizing serf owners who previously granted large allotments, the 
Economic Section planned to define “existing allotments” not as they actually were, but 
as a range of sizes deemed average for a given locale.  Peasants with current 
allotments outside of this norm received either additional land or a reduction.  Peasants 
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eligible for additional land (those whose current allotment size fell below the minimum 
for the area) received it only if they agreed to assume the additional obligations 
attached to it, and only if supplementing peasant allotments did not shrink the demesne 
to less than one-third of its current size.42  The Economic Section also acted to ensure 
‘sufficiency’ for both sosloviia when it chose to rely on past custom to specify peasant 
access rights to pastures and forests.43  However, the commitment to compensate 
nobles at some level (thus providing capital to intensify cultivation on the remainder of 
their estates); the inability to do so from state coffers because of a banking crisis; and 
the subsequent need to determine how much peasants would have to pay to redeem 
their allotments (redemption payments—vykupnye platezhi) raised the issue of the 
actual value of peasant allotments.  The state’s self-assigned role as banker for the 
redemption operation gave it a vital interest in determining the actual value of the lands 
for which it soon held forty-nine year mortgages.44 
The market provided reformers with little assistance.  Serf-owners could not sell 
land without its attached labor supply, and thus market prices (to the extent that they 
existed at all) provided little indication of land value.  The Editing Commissions, of 
course, received voluminous assistance from serf owners themselves (members of the 
provincial committees), for whom the prospect of losing their servile labor supply 
necessitated a reconceptualization of the value of their assets (i.e., what the land and 
serf labor cost individually).45  Thus it is not surprising, given heightened noble concern 
with the value of their assets, state concerns about its proposed credit operation, and 
several participants’ involvement in Kiselev’s reforms, that the idea of determining land 
values by cadastral means entered the discussion.  Reformers soon concluded that a 
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lack of reliable information and the state goal of improving peasant life necessitated 
using current obligations as a basis for calculating post-emancipation obligations.46  
However, this solution satisfied few completely, and several provincial committees and 
Editing Commission members recommended a periodic re-evaluation of peasant 
obligations in light of current average grain prices or a cadastre. 
P. P. Semenov—a person eminently knowledgeable in the realm of statistics—
labeled the first action unjust and the second impractical.  Using a “grain rent” formula in 
Russia was unjust because poor infrastructure and long distances to markets created 
imperfections in Russia’s grain market.47  Creating a cadastre also presented problems.  
The French cadastre begun in 1807 was expensive and hardly perfect.  The Austrian 
cadastre initiated in 1817 was still not done.  Prussia completed cadastres only in its 
Westphalian and Rhine provinces.48  Classifying land by whole areas instead of single 
estates—a method eventually adopted during Kiselev’s reforms—simplified the process.  
However, in this situation, Semenov argued, such a method could only lead to 
unsatisfactory results.  In particular, in 1842 the Ministry of State Domains found it 
necessary to use ‘more accurate methods of enumeration’ (i. e., to collect data on non-
agricultural income).  In short, repeating the process for the lands used by serfs would 
be an even larger project—a task for which the state had neither sufficient means nor 
time.49  Furthermore, Semenov argued, as instruments designed for equalizing the 
distribution of land taxes, cadastres did not provide the actual value of the land, but only 
its relative value.  This made such a method unsuitable for determining peasant 
obligations (and pomeshchik compensation) because ‘with a cadastre, obrok would be 
either very low (to the disadvantage of the pomeshchik) or so high that paying it would 
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be disastrous for peasants’.50  The ‘shock’ to the values of pomeshchik estates would 
be especially great in non-black soil regions and the increase in peasant payment 
burdens would be onerous in agricultural areas.  From this it followed that, while using a 
cadastre to determine peasant payments did not meet the Editing Commissions’ goals 
of guaranteeing peasant livelihoods and establishing nobles as capitalist farmers, the 
‘existing fact’ of current payments did.51 
Because of the complications involved in obtaining (in a timely fashion) and 
interpreting necessary data and the fact that the emancipation process contributed to 
the creation of a separate peasant economy based on subsistence, the drafters of the 
redemption procedures followed the lead of Prussia and Austria by using average local 
obrok (quitrent) as a basis for assigning value to the allotments.  The commission 
calculating land values capitalized obrok payments at six percent.52  Thus, difficulties 
surrounding the emancipation resulted in redemption payments that, again, said more 
about the ability of peasants to pay than about the actual value of the allotments.  By 
1878, 7,747,265 ‘revisional souls’ (peasant tax units) were redeeming 27,630,467 
desiatiny of land with redemption payments totaling 43,741,493 rubles.53 
However, in spite of basing redemption payments on existing obligations, the 
abolition of serf status, the Rescripts, and the redemption operation implied something 
quite different, namely that: a) the allotment should guarantee peasants’ subsistence 
needs and; b) that the allotment should also yield an income sufficient for meeting 
payment obligations—including redemption payments.  In essence, the government 
caught itself in the emancipation’s ambiguity.  Capitalizing obrok—the peasant’s ability 
to pay—manifested continuance of the serf economy, whereby sufficiency meant 
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guaranteeing the existence of human assets as a means of guaranteeing income.  
However, the emancipation process, including the redemption operation, inserted 
something quite different into this equation: the concept that land had a value in and of 
itself.  This was a somewhat novel idea in a country where land surplus and labor 
shortage had linked land and labor in the institution of serfdom.  It seemed quite 
reasonable to many that the increasing availability of data on the agrarian economy 
made it possible to measure whether or not the emancipation met its own goals by 
calculating allotment values and comparing them to payments. 
 
Statistical Research and the “Insufficient Allotment” 
The most prominent investigation, St. Petersburg University professor of 
statistics Iu. E. Ianson's study of peasant land allotments and payments, appeared in 
1877.54  This first edition received simultaneous praise and criticism for suggesting that 
peasants received insufficient allotments in the course of the emancipation.  Feeling 
compelled to respond to critics—most notably Dmitrii F. Samarin—Ianson issued a 
second edition of his work in 1881.55  In addition to denying his invention of any ‘theory 
of insufficient allotments’, and offering readers a chance to judge the book for 
themselves, Ianson argued that the book was an important guide to economic policy, 
especially in Russia. Statistical study was crucial to the state’s paternalistic duty to 
foster economic sufficiency and development: 
That which in Western Europe is now only propagandized as the highest 
principle of economic science—the state’s leading significance in the attainment 
of public welfare—has historically entered into public life here.  State power 
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stands here not only by the controls of the administrative mechanism, but at 
the helm of economic success and progress.  …[U]nder these conditions the 
study of economic life comprises a necessary prerequisite of correct state 
action….56 
Ianson presented a cautious study.  By necessity, the work used average figures 
that could not be applied to specific peasant allotments.  This bothered him for 
methodological reasons.  He regretted the work’s limited source base (mainly the 
Valuev Commission’s published work) and noted that he had avoided a large volume of 
anecdotal evidence related to peasant land rental and purchase because he saw ‘no 
significant strength of proof in such non-statistical data’.57  Yet, he stood by his 
conviction that the book depicted ‘one of the many causes…of the unfavorable 
economic condition of a significant number of former serfs’—namely that in spite of the 
state's intentions, the landed emancipation left peasants without sufficient means to 
feed themselves and meet payment obligations.58  Income derived from peasant 
allotments did not correspond to payments levied against them.  Ianson's work, which 
carried the scientific prestige of his university chair, thus converted the cadastre into a 
new measure of household sufficiency.  It suggested that the state’s paternalistic duty 
required new legislation that considered actual land values, rather than total household 
income. 
Beginning with an examination of allotments and payments in non-black soil 
provinces, Ianson acknowledged that allotments could not themselves be sufficient in 
these areas.59  However, while noting that peasants in these areas had a long history or 
supplementing their incomes with non-agricultural pursuits, his analysis of consumption 
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needs, production costs, and harvests also pointed out that these allotments were 
insufficient even for feeding peasant families.  ‘Given the insufficiency of allotments’, he 
noted, ‘it is understandable that not only all taxes, but even redemption payments 
cannot be paid from the land’s income’.  Redemption payments two to three times the 
obrok payments of local state peasants exacerbated the situation, especially as local 
wages were often so low that they failed to ameliorate the situation.  Data collected for 
zemstvo tax assessments, which calculated average income for an extended period of 
time, confirmed this.60 
His analysis of black-soil provinces revealed that even in this fertile region, 
generally considered profitable for farming, peasant allotments did not fulfill the 
emancipation’s goal of providing peasants with sustenance and the ability to make 
payments.61  Using official data, Ianson posited a series of average peasant families 
and proceeded, again, to calculate net allotment income by subtracting consumption 
needs and production costs measured in market prices.  The end result was virtually the 
same as in non-black soil areas.  While, on paper, peasants could generally feed 
themselves from their allotments, the land did not generate a surplus for redemption 
and other payments.62  In part this was because even though redemption payments in 
nine black-soil provinces were from 14% (Orel) to 48% (Riazan’) less than pre-
emancipation quitrents, post-emancipation allotments were smaller in all provinces but 
three.  In addition, he argued, ‘cut-offs’—deprivation of free access to pasture and 
firewood—also negated much of the benefit of lower payments.  These items now had 
to be purchased from the local lord and thus constituted a further strain on peasant 
budgets.63  Thus, in many cases peasant economic conditions were ‘worse than under 
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serfdom’.  Current land allotments, ‘without other guarantees of their welfare’ not only 
could not protect peasants ‘from poverty and proletarianization, but sometimes even 
deprived them of their daily bread’.  Calculated in market terms, peasant income was 
‘fictional’.64  By 1895 Ianson’s argument—which confirmed the suspicions of the populist 
intelligentsia—was immortalized in late imperial Russia’s most authoritative reference 
work, Brokgauz and Efron’s Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’.  According to the encyclopedia, 
Ianson’s work ‘had established beyond a doubt the inadequacy of peasant land 
allotments and their excessively high assessments.65 
 Dmitrii Samarin, a landowner and commentator on peasant affairs, attacked 
Ianson's work by noting that redemption payments had never been intended to 
correspond to the actual value of the land, and therefore could in no way be connected 
to the size or actual value of peasant allotments.  Redemption payments were simply 
another tax—a personal obligation to the state.  However, this point tended to be 
ignored, as other research supported Ianson's conclusions.  As an increasing number of 
Russia’s zemstvos turned to collecting statistical data for local tax assessment, these 
data (which also calculated allotment income using market prices) supported Ianson’s 
conclusions and further disseminated the notion of insufficient allotments among the 
reading public.66  Moscow statistician V. I. Orlov noted in his study of the peasant 
economy that the lack of correspondence between payments and allotment income was 
one of the chief factors contributing to peasant abandonment of allotments and frequent 
communal repartitions.  These actions increased the burden on other villagers who, 
because of the principle of collective responsibility, became responsible for the 
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additional dues.  Tver’ statistician V. I. Pokrovskii reached similar conclusions after an 
analysis of hypothetical family budgets revealed average deficits of nearly sixty rubles.67 
Other research from the academic community also supported Ianson’s 
conclusions.  I. I. Vil'son, a respected representative of Russian statistics within the 
Imperial Russian Geographic Society, noted in his study of the redemption operation 
that the main cause of arrears (outside of fires, crop failures and other ‘temporary’ 
setbacks) was the fact that in many regions soil quality and other geographic factors 
precluded any correspondence between redemption payments and income from 
peasant allotments.68  The economist L. Khodskii, arguing against Samarin, agreed.  
According to Khodskii's calculations the biggest discrepancy was in Perm’ province, 
where redemption payments exceeded ‘bank value’ by more than 70%.  Peasants 
received the best deal in Astrakhan province; there the land’s bank value exceeded 
redemption payments by nearly 178%.  At times, provincial figures obscured regional 
variations in soil quality.  Thus even though bank value exceeded redemption payments 
by around 20% and 90% for Chernigov and Kursk provinces respectively, a closer 
examination revealed that all peasants in these provinces did not share this good 
fortune.69 
Thus, in spite of the fact that redemption payments were based (out of necessity) 
on peasants’ ability to pay, by the end of the 1870s an increasing number of statistical 
studies focused attention instead on allotment value itself—a cadastre measurement of 
peasant well-being—rather than total peasant household income.  These studies turned 
agrarian crisis into an established fact, especially in terms of providing an explanation 
for what officials saw as a key indicator of crisis: the increase in tax and redemption 
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payment arrears.70  Rural poverty now had a ‘scientifically’ determined cause.  
Literary descriptions of the countryside as cesspools of poverty and despair put a 
human face on these cold numerical facts.71 
 
Redemption Payment Reductions 
In this atmosphere the government began the task of reviewing the redemption 
process.  Law required the government to either force redemption or re-assess the 
obrok payments of so-called ‘temporarily-obligated’ peasants after twenty years.  This 
term expired in 1881.  The redemption operation’s profitability also convinced some 
officials that the government had a moral obligation to reconsider redemption amounts.  
Furthermore, a commission reviewing tax codes believed that tax reform made sense 
only after review of other obligations.72  The process of reducing redemption payments 
reveals the increasing application of cadastre measurement principles to the peasant 
economy, a process that reinforced the idea that the emancipation statute, rather than 
providing a patriarchal guarantee of sufficiency and an improvement in peasant life, had 
overcharged peasants for their land and plunged peasant agriculture into crisis. 
A Finance Ministry commission reviewing the redemption operation reached a 
similar conclusion.  Data from several sources indicated that, although random 
catastrophes (fires, epidemics, crop failures) initiated the cycle of decline, the 
incongruency between redemption payments and allotment income guaranteed the 
perpetual impoverishment of many villages.  A vicious cycle ensued, whereby arrears 
led to a depletion of assets (sale of livestock and hence, fertilizer), and more arrears.  
Non black-soil regions, which required regular and substantial amounts of manure, 
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suffered most acutely. Collected data also led the commission to the conclusion that 
‘cut-offs’ exacerbated this condition.  Emancipated peasants thus no longer had 
sufficient means to make payments of their previous size.73  Furthermore, the 
commission's own comparison of redemption values and current land prices revealed a 
large discrepancy.  For example, land in Smolensk province valued at 27.33 
rubles/desiatina for redemption purposes had a current market value of only 15.80 
rubles/desiatina.  The Editing Commissions had assumed that all land yielded an 
income of at least five percent on capital.  In the case of Smolensk province this meant 
that redemption payments of 1.64 rubles/desiatina should in reality be only 0.79 
rubles/desiatina—a 52.1% reduction.  These figures, as well as those for twenty-two 
other provinces, indicated that redemption payments could be aligned with actual land 
values only by reducing them to 41.5% of the current annual assessment (i.e., reducing 
total collections from 20,045,450 to 8,327,268 rubles).74 
The idea that redemption payments exceeded actual allotment value became 
axiomatic as discussion passed through yet another commission to the stage of policy 
formation.   The new commission included a number of peasant affairs ‘experts’ from 
Russia's zemstvos.75  Their opinions provided a basis for the reduction statutes enacted 
in December 1881.  The commission majority took what it believed to be a strict 
constructionist approach to the redemption issue.  It argued that it was ‘impossible’ to 
consider former serf obrok payments (or barshchina—corvée—converted into cash) as 
anything like rent and quoted the Editing Commissions’ work to the effect that there was 
little correlation between allotment size and the size of obligations.  Furthermore, 
although the majority (led by Dmitrii Samarin and Prince A. A. Shcherbatov) agreed that 
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there was a crisis in rural Russia, it also believed that as the emancipation statute 
concerned the empire as a whole, morally the state could only adjust the terms of 
emancipation in such a way that all peasants were treated equally.  Linking payments to 
allotment income would be merely an economic move; the ‘personal element, which 
comprises its [the redemption relationship's] main basis’ demanded that the state 
ensure that obligations did not exceed the ‘paying powers of the peasant’ from all 
sources of peasant income.  The majority extended this argument to include a call for 
tax reform (especially abolishing the poll tax) and equalizing taxes among all categories 
of peasants.76  The majority opinion reflected the traditional patriarchal approach to the 
peasantry maintained by government and serf-owner alike—the idea of sufficiency as 
total household income rather than actual allotment value. 
 The commission minority agreed with the majority's interpretation of the 
emancipation statute, but argued that the majority's case ignored other aspects of the 
redemption process and presented a static view of the issue.  According to the minority 
report, although the original spirit and method of calculating redemption payments 
pointed towards defining them as personal obligations, other aspects of the redemption 
program, including the actual redemption process, pointed towards a different 
conclusion.  ‘Obrok’, noted the minority report, 
represents a permanent payment…that can be raised or lowered over a defined 
time period according to pomeshchik or peasant demands....  Redemption 
payments are limited payments, restricted to a set number of years and including 
a component absent in obrok, namely a percent of remittance.  This radical 
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difference between the two types of payments directly demonstrates that it is 
impossible to attach the same meaning to redemption payments as to obrok....77 
 Redemption payments, in reality, were akin to payments on a loan.  The minority 
report also argued that peasants recognized ‘very clearly and forcefully…the difference 
existing between redemption payments and other collections levied upon them’, 
knowing well how many payments remained until the land was fully redeemed.  As 
such, the redemption operation was unlike tax reform, and any decision to lower 
payments should be based on financial criteria related to the actual redemption 
process.78  In other words, although ‘ability to pay’ and ‘the improvement of peasant life’ 
guided the Editing Commissions as they developed the redemption process, a system 
based on substantially different criteria—land value—resulted from their deliberations.  
The minority proposed that redemption payments be brought in line with allotment 
income on a province-by-province basis.  Zemstvo land assessment figures and other 
data could provide information for this purpose.  Areas deemed especially needy 
deserved reduction priority.  The minority recommended a general ten percent reduction 
only after adjusting redemption payments to correspond with assessed value.79  Thus 
the minority, by using the cadastre conception of sufficiency, kept alive the main idea 
behind the perception of agrarian crisis—namely the idea that there should be a closer 
correlation between the size of redemption payments and the value of the allotments 
being redeemed. 
This idea appeared in the final text of the reduction statute.  The law incorporated 
the majority’s view that the reduction should be empire-wide, including most of 
European Russia and western Siberia, and increased the initial reduction sum to twelve 
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million rubles.  At this point, the influence of the minority report and the idea of crisis 
came into play.  The law earmarked part of the twelve million rubles for a general 
reduction of redemption payments.  Part of the sum, however, was set aside for a 
supplemental reduction (dobavka) for villages with economies in ‘disorder’ 
(razstroistvo).  The most important indicator of disorder (and hence, eligibility for a 
supplemental reduction) was a discrepancy between redemption payments and 
allotment values.80  This aspect of the program colored the entire process, especially 
as—by involving all of Russia's zemstvo institutions—implementing the supplementary 
reductions became a very public affair.  In addition, supplementary reductions rested on 
a much tighter correlation between redemption payments and allotment income than the 
majority's conception of redemption payments (redemption of obligations) allowed.  
Implementing the supplemental reduction highlighted the tension between ‘sufficiency’ 
in a traditional sense and sufficiency as measured in cadastre terms, and further 
implanted the notion of peasant economic crisis. 
 
The Supplemental Reduction 
The zemstvo experts also considered reduction fund allocation methods.  
Because the majority considered the reduction process as correcting tax inequalities, it 
recommended that the peasant's ability to pay be gauged by a wide variety of economic 
indicators.  Its list included the percentage change in population, average allotment size 
and value, soil quality, the rise or fall of non-agricultural employment opportunities, and 
total arrears.  The majority acknowledged that such a list precluded the ‘mathematical 
accuracy’ of calculating allotment income, but noted that ‘such accuracy is often 
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misleading’.  The primary goal of equating payments with total ability to pay dictated 
that supplementary reductions be assigned after collection and consideration of a broad 
spectrum of economic factors.81 
Since the minority advocated reductions only on the basis of discrepancies 
between redemption payments and allotment value (i.e., that the reduction operation 
was a refinancing of debt based on new information, not tax relief), it recommended 
indicators related to land values, particularly zemstvo tax assessment figures.82  In a 
special opinion, Prince A. I. Vasil'chikov, an expert on peasant agriculture, gave 
qualified support to the minority's view.  He noted that consideration of outside sources 
of income was superfluous to the business at hand, and would soon be taken into 
account in the process of tax reform.  Even though land value could be figured only 
imperfectly, when combined with other (also imperfect) indicators such as livestock 
numbers, it remained the best available indicator of whether or not excessive 
redemption payments caused economic distress.83  Thus, the original tension between 
competing definitions of redemption payments manifested itself again when it came to 
recommending supplemental reduction criteria (i.e., measures of ‘sufficiency’). Although 
the general reduction reflected state recognition that redemption payments were more 
than mortgages, the implementation of the project emphasized the opposite idea (i.e., a 
close correlation between redemption payments and land values). 
With these recommendations in hand, the Central Statistical Committee (TsSK) 
began collecting data on three forms in the second half of 1881.  Form 2 requested 
information on temporarily obligated peasants’ obrok payments and arrears as of 
January 1, 1881.84  The TsSK then asked that zemstvos use information from Forms 1 
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and 2 to complete Form 3.  When completed, this form listed villages whose 
economic ‘disarray’ required a supplementary reduction.  In defining ‘disarray’, the TsSK 
asked that zemstvos consider only systemic causes related to the quality of land 
allotments, such as the fact that redemption payments exceeded actual income in 
normal years.  Land shortages and other ‘temporary’ setbacks (fire, crop failure, etc.) 
were not grounds for inclusion on Form 3, since the state was mostly concerned that 
redemption payments reflected the true worth of peasant allotments.85  Thus, although 
questions on Forms 1 and 2 pertained to collecting a broad base of information for 
determining the peasant's ability to pay (in line with the majority), the minority's 
emphasis on value prevailed on Form 3. 
The TsSK used information from all three forms to award supplementary 
reductions.  The award process illustrates the general acceptance of a cadastre 
paradigm (i.e., that peasant allotment land could be measured like any other) and the 
pervasiveness of the view that rural crisis stemmed from an imbalance between 
redemption payments and land values—from a new conception of sufficiency that 
defined the ability to pay (i.e., measured peasant well-being) solely in terms of land 
productivity and market criteria.  What seemed sufficient to emancipators, or even the 
zemstvo expert majority (ability to pay), became increasingly less so when zemstvos 
had to justify supplemental reductions.  The TsSK’s evaluation of property for 
supplemental reductions in terms of soil quality and other criteria reflecting allotment 
value gives credence to this interpretation. 
The Riazan' province report provides a good example, for it was TsSK director P. 
P. Semenov’s home province and the subject of his own recent research (1878-1879).86  
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In addition, the issue erupted into open dispute in the Dankovsk district zemstvo.  
Two deputies demanded that the governing board omit land shortage from the factors 
that qualified villages to be included on Form 3.  Considering land shortage, they 
argued, implied that the emancipation had cheated peasants.  Another deputy 
disagreed, and his argument illustrates how the idea of crisis, both in terms of land 
shortage and excessive redemption payments, had permeated society.  Pointing to 
Ianson’s work, N. I. Kotov argued that the question of insufficient peasant land 
allotments had already been demonstrated "in the sense that the size of allotments has 
been recognized as insufficient both for sustenance and for the fulfillment of tax 
obligations."  He also noted that the zemstvo itself had reached this conclusion ten 
years earlier while considering government tax reform proposals.87  The deputies 
resolved to consider all of these factors. 
 Compared to other Riazan' province districts, Dankovsk peasants enjoyed 
above-average economic conditions.  Although the average number of cattle per 
household (0.8) indicated certain insufficiencies, the number of horses and adult male 
workers per household (1.5 and 1.7, respectively) and average per capita allotment size 
(2.2 desiatinas) were at or above provincial averages.88  Redemption payment arrears 
totaled only sixteen percent of annual collections.  The zemstvo, however, listed more 
than half (121) of the districts 237 villages as being in a state of economic disorder.  
According to the zemstvo's information, twenty-four of the 121 villages were on the list 
by virtue of the quality of their allotments.  The rest owed their spot to a variety of other 
causes.  For the TsSK, however, most of these other maladies did not address the 
point, which was allotment value as reflected in its ability to produce an income.  The 
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TsSK did not doubt that the zemstvo raised a number of valid concerns.  It noted, 
however, that problems such as shortages of land, employment opportunities and credit 
were difficult to measure and, in fact, characterized the whole district.89  The zemstvo’s 
only credible case was what could be measured—the value of allotments as compared 
with redemption payments.  This indicator could rightly serve as a basis for a permanent 
reduction of redemption payments, while the other causes could, at best, serve as a 
basis for temporary relief.  Thus, the TsSK only awarded supplementary reductions to 
the twenty-four villages where the zemstvo demonstrated that allotment income fell 
short of the sum charged for redeeming the plots.90  Land value compared to 
redemption payments became a measure of the condition of peasant villages. 
 The Bezhetsk district (Tver' province) report also exemplified a cadastre measure 
of ‘sufficiency’.  Based on previous zemstvo statistical work and other data, the zemstvo 
concluded that it was ‘impossible not to recognize that existing redemption 
payments...in several townships do not correspond to the land’s productive 
capabilities...’.  This meant that any reduction in payments ‘should not in any way be 
equal for all locations, but should correspond to the quality and productive capabilities of 
the soil’.  To remedy the situation, the zemstvo asked the TsSK to accept the land 
values it derived through statistical investigation.  These values, calculated by 
subtracting production costs from gross income, indicated that redemption payments for 
two groups of villages required reductions of twenty-five and fifty percent in order to 
correspond to actual allotment value.91  The TsSK concurred that poor soil quality 
created a large disparity between income and payments.  It split the difference between 
 31 
the zemstvo's reduction requests, granting villages with the greatest discrepancy 
between payments and income a thirty percent supplementary reduction.92 
 The case of Solikolamsk district (Perm' province) adds another layer of 
understanding to this process.  The zemstvo argued that, based on ‘experienced data’ 
(i. e. data obtained from deputies' own agricultural endeavors), redemption payments 
exceeded net allotment land income per desiatina over a four-year period.93  Only 
villages with hayfields, key to maintaining livestock herds and fertilizer supplies, had 
profitable allotments. 94  One might wonder why no accounts of mass starvation 
accompanied the report, given the absence of peasant income for four years.  The lack 
of such reports can be explained by the fact the zemstvo deputies saw the peasantry 
through the cadastre paradigm.  Deputies calculated average income based on their 
own experience, that is, as if the same notion of profit driving their own economic 
activity also motivated neighboring peasants. 
 The Stavropol' district zemstvo (Samara province) submitted a more 
sophisticated analysis which also presented a contradictory portrait of the local 
economy.  As with the example above, the contradiction stemmed from the zemstvo 
deputies' view of the peasant economy as little different from their own farming.  After 
completing an inventory of the district’s 105 peasant communities, deputies calculated 
average figures for family composition, livestock inventory, land tilled, harvests, and 
expenses (including taxes).  They used these figures to create a hypothetical ‘average’ 
peasant family budget.  The compilers attempted to account for every possible income 
and expenditure, including arrears.  The final figure in the expense column totaled 
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nearly forty-two rubles more than the hypothetical ‘average’ peasant family’s 
calculated income.95 
 But, once again, there were no reports of starving villages.  The zemstvo 
conceded that none of the villages inhabited by their average peasant were in a state of 
‘disorder’. Deputies argued, however, that ‘because of small allotments in Stavropol’ 
district, redemption payments seem higher, and thus seem to correspond less to the 
advantages extracted from the lands of the province as a whole’.96  Thus, the 
discrepancy between income and expenses should make at least four villages eligible 
for a supplemental reduction.  The TsSK conceded the detailed nature and proper 
foundation of the zemstvo's case, but hesitated to grant a supplemental reduction 
because of the area's soil quality.  Semenov and his co-workers believed that, given the 
district’s high fertility, the 14% general reduction would be sufficient to align income and 
payments.  However, the TsSK—acknowledging that the relationship between payments 
and allotment income resulted from the quality of particular allotments—gave the 
Samara provincial zemstvo great latitude in distributing the province’s supplemental 
funds in accordance with local surveys.  Stavropol’ ultimately received 3,281 of the 
province’s 12,660 ruble reduction funds.  As with the case in Solikolamsk district, the 
fact that pomeshchiki calculated peasant income as if peasant economic behavior 
differed little from their own led to an incongruity between the data and reality.  The 
TsSK and the provincial zemstvo ultimately supported these figures, bolstering both the 
idea that sufficiency could be measured in cadastre terms and the notion of rural 
crisis.97 
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In the rare case where a zemstvo argued for a supplemental reduction on the 
basis of peculiarities in peasant agriculture, the TsSK ignored that evidence and 
emphasized a reduction based on soil quality and allotment value alone.  The report for 
Saratov's Kuznetsk district argued that, although local land values were high, this did 
not reflect the true value and income potential of peasant land.  The zemstvo asked for 
a blanket reduction of twenty-five percent for all of the villages listed on Form 3, noting 
that certain aspects of peasant agriculture, such as the "stretching" of allotments into 
elongated strips, hindered animal husbandry and required ‘a double or triple 
expenditure of labor for tillage’.  This reduced the value of such land in comparison with 
non-peasant lands of equal fertility.  The zemstvo received its reduction, but not on the 
basis of this argument.  The TsSK justified granting the zemstvo's request, once again, 
on the basis of soil quality.  Added evidence of high redemption payment arrears 
convinced the committee that there was a discrepancy between payments and the clay 
soil’s ability to produce an income.98  Sufficiency in terms of value prevailed. 
 
Conclusion 
Only further demographic and consumption research will ultimately reveal the 
existence or extent of Russia’s agrarian crisis.  What the above narrative suggests is 
the role of continuity and change in history.  The paternalistic conception of sufficiency 
developed within the serf economy and embodied in the ‘great principles’ of the 
emancipation process—combined with the increasing application of capitalist 
measurement to a non-capitalist economy (i.e., one where family subsistence needs 
supercede profit considerations)—created the perception of a rural crisis rooted in the 
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insufficiency of peasant allotments.  Thus, although we now have reason to question 
the actual existence of crisis (e.g., peasants seldom defaulted on redemption 
payments), the pre-1861 serf economy ironically emerged to contemporaries as a 
golden era where access to adequate resources enabled peasants to meet subsistence 
needs and payments.99 
The emancipation process itself laid the groundwork for a perception of rural 
crisis.  On one hand, it acknowledged and set out to perpetuate a subsistence-oriented 
peasant economy and a market oriented noble economy—at least until such a future 
time that enlightenment integrated the benighted peasantry into the market.  
Furthermore, Samarin and the majority of zemstvo experts were correct in seeing the 
emancipation as a process that involved interests beyond those of the peasantry.  
However, at the same time the emancipation (like Kiselev’s earlier reforms) raised the 
issue of the value of peasant land allotments.  Although emancipators relied on peasant 
ability to pay as a means of determining redemption payments (rejecting a formal 
cadastre as impractical), the state’s plans to compensate pomeshchiki and charge 
peasants pushed those involved to conceptualize Russia’s rural economy in cadastre 
terms (i.e., as a single rural economy that could be measured by market criteria).  The 
emancipation combined traditional paternalism and its conception of sufficiency as total 
household income (the ‘great principles’) with a new measure of sufficiency as land 
value.  Thus, as increasing data on peasant income became available in the 
emancipation’s wake, Ianson’s and others’ studies of peasant income and payments all 
applied a cadastre measure to gauge the condition of the peasant economy.  Their 
discoveries attributed peasant distress to the insufficiency of peasant allotments—
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specifically a non-congruence between redemption payments and allotment value.  
These works gave the idea of crisis a new statistical reality and covered it with a thick 
scientific veneer.  The emancipation appeared in a new and more sinister light: not only 
had the peasantry been deprived of all the land, but the land they received was over-
priced. 
Although statutory and practical issues led to reconsideration of redemption 
payments, a sense of crisis—embodied in alarming data on arrears—added urgency to 
the project.  Here, as with the original emancipation process, a tension emerged 
between peasant ability to pay (the position of the zemstvo expert majority) and the 
actual value of allotments (the concerns of the zemstvo expert minority).  Although the 
reduction process made allowances for non-agricultural income (ability to pay), 
Semenov and the TsSK increasingly attached primary significance to allotment value as 
a measure of peasant household sufficiency—especially in the allocation of 
supplemental reductions.  The non-correspondence of allotment value and redemption 
payments was a primary indicator of economic ‘disorder’.  This was a cadastre view of 
the peasant economy, a paradigm of a single rural economy (rather than separate 
peasant and pomeshchik spheres) wherein the value of agricultural land was universally 
determinable by subtracting market production costs from commodity prices.  In this 
way the government’s own procedures in the reduction process, based on the idea that 
peasant land value could be calculated in market terms, perpetuated a cadastre 
conception of sufficiency and the notion of crisis.  This perception persisted as a 
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